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Battle of Veseris, 340 BC
The battle of Veseris (or Vesuvius) of 340 BC was the first major battle of the Latin War of 340-338 BC and was a Roman victory made famous by the execution of the young Manlius Torquatus by his father, the consul Manlius Torquatus and the self-sacrifice of the consul Decius Mus.
At the start of the Latin War the combined Latin and Campanian armies were based around Capua. The Romans responded by sending both consuls into Campania, to operate together. This reflects the serious nature of the threat to Rome, as normally the two consuls operated separately.
The Latin revolt posed a direct threat to Roman power. As a stroke it halved the strength of the Roman army by removing their normal allies. Worse, the Latins fought in the same way as the Romans, with the same equipment and organisation. The battle of Veseris would resemble to battles of later Roman civil wars, with legions on both sides (both sides also had allies with them - Samnites for the Romans and Campanians for the Latins, but their role in the battle, if any, is not clear).
After a period of manoeuvring that isn't detailed by Livy the two armies reached the vicinity of Mount Vesuvius, close to the Veseris river. At some point during this period the first famous incident of the battle took place. The consuls were aware that their men and their Latin opponents had often served alongside each other, and were worried about what would happen if the two sides were allowed to mingle, they ordered that no one was to leave his post to fight the enemy without orders.
After this order was issued a patrol led by T. Manlius Torquatus, the consul's son, ran into a Latin force led by Geminus Maecius, a well known Tusculan warrior. He challenged Manlius to a single combat, and despite his father's orders Manlius accepted the challenge. He won the duel, but on his return to the Roman camp was arrested, and to maintain discipline was beheaded. At the time this made Torquatus the consul desperately unpopular, although he later became a model of Roman virtue.
The second famous incident can be traced back to Decius Mus's original rise to fame, at the battle of Saticula (343 B.C.), during the First Samnite War. Here Mus had saved a Roman army from a Samnite trap, and according to Livy at one point had inspired his men by recounting a dream in which he would die a glorious death in battle. Now, with when the consuls were camped outside Capua, they both had a dream in which a dreadful presence told them that one of the consuls and the enemy army had been dedicated to the gods of the under world. The omens continued to come.
As the two armies prepared for battle the Romans consulted their soothsayers. They announced that the future looked bleak for Decius Mus, but good for his fellow consul and for the army. These omens all pointed to the devotio, a ritual in which one of the consuls and the enemy army would indeed by dedicated to the gods of the under world. That consul would then have to throw himself into the enemy lines and seek to be killed. The two consuls now agreed that the commander of whichever wing of the army buckled first would carry out the devotio.
When the battle began Manlius commanded the Roman right and Decius the left. As the Romans had expected the two lines were very equally balanced, and eventually the hastati on the Roman left were forced to retreat behind the principes. Decius Mus took this as a sign that it was time to perform the devotio. After carrying out the required ceremonies he charged into the Latin lines, and was promptly killed.
This left Manlius Torquatus in command of the entire Roman army. Despite his colleague's sacrifice the Latins were still pressing heavily on the Roman lines, and it was almost time for Torquatus to call on the triarii, the third and final line of the legions. Instead he called the accensi forward. These were the lightest troops in the legion, normally armed with slings, but on this occasion the Latins apparently mistook them for the triarii, and threw their own triarii into the battle. After these Latin reserves had tired themselves out, Manlius finally unleashed his own triarii. The Latin front line was destroyed, and the rest of the army defeated almost without a fight. According to Livy one a quarter of the Latin force survived.
The role of the Samnites and Campanians in the battle is unclear, although it seems likely that they fought each other. By the end of the battle the Latin and Campanian camp had been captured, and many Campanians killed there, and the Samnites were threatening the Latin flanks.
This defeat seems to have knocked the Campanians out of the war, but the Latins retreated back north towards their homeland, receiving reinforcements as they went. They were followed by the Roman army, now under control of the sole remaining consul, and suffered a second defeat at Trifanum.
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VESERIS - 340 BC
Romes Latin allies resented their treatment as 2nd class citizens and things came to a head when after the 1st Samnite war the Latins went to the aid the Sidicini who were being attacked by the Samnites and to whom the Romans had refused help. As per their treaty the Samnites asked the Romans to call off their Latin allies which Rome duly did, fearing the result of successful independant latin action. The Latin delagation to Rome requested equal rights with Romans. This request was rejected in such a harsh way by the Roman Senate that they actually declared war on Latinum, and the rival legions met at the foot of Mount Vesuvius near the river or town of Veseris.
The Latins, confident after their success against the Samnites, pushed strongly at first, but a combination of the act of devotio by Decius Mus and the late commitment of the Roman Triari into the tireing latins won the day for Rome.
The stage is set. The battle lines are drawn and you are in command. The rest is history.
Battle of Veseris, 340 BC - History
Rome’s relations with its Neighbours (358 - 342 BC)
A s discussed on a previous page , Rome renewed the ancient Latin peace in 358 BC. It seems that this had the desired effect, at least from the Roman point of view: as Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 7) pointed out:
“Livy makes no mention of any hostilities from any Latin states [other than Tibur and Praeneste] for almost two decades] and the Latins presumably supplied their quota of troops [for most of this period]. This may well have lain behind Rome’s expansion in the 350s and 340s BC . ”
He also observed (at pp. 4-5) that:
“. there can be no doubt that, by 358 BC, the Hernici had [also] been subdued: Livy did not mention Hernican wars again until the revolt in 307-6 BC . ”
In 358 BC, the Romans were able to create two new tribes, the Poblilia and the Pomptina, for Roman citizens that were settled in these areas.
However, as discussed in a my pages on .
✴ Rome was at war with many of its other neighbours (including Tibur, Praeneste, the Volsci and the Aurunci) for much of the 350s and 340s BC and
✴ she declared her first war with the Samnites in 343 BC.
War with the Volsci of Privernum and Antium (342-1 BC)
Yellow dots = Rome and the centres of Latium
Blue squares = Volscian centres ( including Satricum, which was rebuilt and colonised by Antium in 348 BC and Formiae, which might, alternatively, have belonged to the Aurunci)
Red italics = likely locations of the Poblilia and Pomptina voting districts (358 BC)
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 393) observed that, as the First Samnite War moved towards its close, and as:
“. Rome steadily grew more influential in Campania, it was inevitable that the Volsci should make a bid for freedom before they were entirely enveloped by territory controlled by [Rome. Since] Rome was embroiled in both domestic strife and conflict with the Samnites [in 342-1 BC, this] was a particularly good time [for the Volsci] to make a move.”
Thus, Livy recorded that, in 342 BC:
“. the Privernates made a sudden incursion and devastated the neighbouring Roman colonies of Norba and Setia”, (‘History of Rome’, 7: 42: 8).
Then, in 341 BC (in the final stage of the First Samnite War):
“. the men of [the Latin colonies of] Norba and Setia brought tidings to Rome that the Privernates were in revolt, and complained of a defeat that they had suffered at their hands. It was also reported that a Volscian army, led by the people of Antium, had encamped at Satricum. [Responsibility for] both wars [was] assigned by ballot to [the consul Caius Plautius Venox]:
✴ He marched first on Privernum . [He easily] overcame the enemy and captured Privernum. After installing a strong garrison in it, he restored it to its inhabitants, but deprived them of two thirds of their territory.
✴ He then led his victorious army towards Satricum, in order to oppose the Antiates. The battle there . was interrupted by a storm before either army had achieved victory. . [However], the Volsci marched off in the night, like beaten men, for Antium. . Plautus proceeded to lay waste the enemy's country as far as the coast”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 1: 1-6).
The most significant element of this account is Livy’s claim that the Romans confiscated two thirds of the territory of Privernum after its surrender. However, as we shall see, there is no evidence that they made any use of it until after the Preivernates had revolted and surrendered again in 329 BC. Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 394 and note 1) suggested that:
“. perhaps [Livy’s] notice of the confiscation of two thirds of [Privernate territory in 341 BC] should be transferred to 329 BC, . [albeit that] the matter cannot be decided beyond all doubt.”
I discuss this suggestion further below.
Renewed Peace with the Samnites (341 BC)
As discussed on the previous page, Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1997, at p. 197) noted that the treaty of 354 BC between the Romans and the Samnites involved:
“. an undertaking not to engage in aggression in the sphere of interest of a friendly state and not to help her enemies. . It is almost invariably held that this treaty established the river Liris (modern Garigliano) as the line demarcating the Roman and Samnite spheres of influence. This is entirely plausible, but rests only on [the] indirect testimony [of later events].”
In other words, later events suggest that the Samnites recognised Rome’s actual or prospective hegemony north and west of the Liris, while Rome recognised that the territory to the east and south of the river (possibly including Campania) lay within the Samnites’ sphere of influence.
The events of the First Samnite War (discussed on the previous page) brought Capua and the surrounding territory south of the Liris into the Roman sphere of influence (which might have constituted a breach of the original treaty). Nevertheless, according to Livy, after the Samnites were defeated, they:
“. pleaded with Romans to grant them peace and the right to war against the Sidicini . , a people who . [were neither under the protection of the Roman people, nor yet their subject. Titus Aemilius, the praetor, laid the Samnites’ petition before the Senate, which voted to renew the treaty with them”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 1: 7-10).
It seem that the renewed treaty recognised the new reality, leaving the Romans free to consolidate their hold on the fertile territory in the coastal strip south of the river and, in return, they were content to allow the Samnites free reign against the Sidicini.
Second Latin War (341 - 338 BC)
According to Livy, after the Samnites had renewed their treaty with Rome in 341 BC, they:
“. marched against the Sidicini . [who] attempted to anticipate them by surrendering to the Romans. [When the Romans] rejected their offer . they took it to the Latins, who had already risen in arms on their own account. Even the Campani [ i.e . the people of Capua and its satellites, Atella, Casilinum and Calatia] joined this notionally anti-Samnite alliance] . and a great army that had been gathered out of all these nations invaded the borders of the Samnites under a Latin general . The Samnites [insisted that], since the Latins and Campani were subject to . the Romans, [the latter should] use their authority and keep them from invading Samnium . [or, failing that], should hold them in check by force of arms”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 2: 5-11).
Following an apparently evasive Roman response,:
“. left the Samnites quite at a loss to understand Roman policy. It also frightened and alienated the Campani and made the Latins . yet more audacious. Accordingly, pretending to prepare for the war against the Samnites, the Latins appointed numerous councils, and . secretly planned for war with Rome. The Campani also supported this planned war against their deliverers”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 3: 1-2).
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 394) pointed out that:
“Since there is no doubt that that the Latins were [allied with both] the Sidicini and the Campani in their struggle against Rome [in 340 BC], it is likely . that Livy was correct to date the formation of [the alliance between them] to 341 BC or thereabouts. . [However], little confidence should be placed in [his] detailed version of the chain of events [that lead to the formation of this alliance against both the Romans and the Samnites].”
Livy certainly had no compunction in recording the fact that the Samnites had immediately exercised their ‘rights’ under the treaty to attack the Sidicini. On the other hand, he portrayed Romans as unwilling participants in the events that this Samnite aggression precipitated. In reality, it seems more likely that the Romans, like the Samnites, moved swiftly and forcefully to consolidated their hold over the Latins and the Campani. In other words, the actions of the Latins, the Campani and the Sidicini in the run-up to the war were almost certainly irrelevant: it was a direct result of the renewal of the treaty between the two most powerful and aggressive peoples of central Italy.
Timothy Cornell (referenced below, 1995, at p. 347) the alliance of the Latins, Sidicini and Campani soon expanded to include:
“. the Volsci, who were already in revolt against Rome. This alliance, which also included the Aurunci, was presumably in response to Rome’s growing power.”
In other words, the so-called Second Latin War was, in fact, a war between:
✴ on the one hand, Romans and Samnites and
✴ on the other, the peoples who had been most threatened by the terms of the recently-renewed treaty between them.
According to Livy, despite the secrecy in which the Latins and the Campani had prepared for war with Rome:
“. information of the conspiracy leaked out . and was brought to Rome. The consuls [Caius Plautius Venox and Lucius Aemilius Mamercus] were commanded to resign their office before their time was up, in order that new consuls might be chosen at once to confront so [potentially] momentous an invasion”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 3: 3-4).
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 405) suggested that this precaution was taken because:
“. the Romans, foreseeing that the new were could never have been finished [in what remained of the old consuls’ tenure], wanted to have the new consuls in office early in order to avoid an awkward transition.”
However, according to Livy:
“. religious concerns arose in relation to the prospect of elections held by men whose authority had been curtailed, and so the Romans had an interregnum ‘History of Rome’, 8: 3: 4).
Dexter Hoyos (in Yardley and Hoyos, referenced below, at p. 323) explained that an interrex was needed because:
“Once the consuls of 341 BC [had been instructed] to abdicate office early, concern arose that the gods would not favour them with their imperium thus diminished.”
“ There were two interreges : Marcus Valerius [Corvus, who did not complete the task in the 5 days assigned to each interrex, followed by an unspecified] Marcus Fabius: the latter announced the election to the consulship of Titus Manlius Torquatus (for the third time) and Publius Decius Mus ”, ‘History of Rome’, 8: 3: 5).
Battle of the Veseris (340 BC)
According to Livy, in 340 BC, the Romans, who were:
“. quite certain that socii nominis Latini (the allies of the Latin name) were going to revolt, . summoned to Rome ten principes Latinorum (leaders of the Latins), so that they might [warn them against taking hostile action against Rome itself or its Samnite allies]”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 3: 8).
When these Latin representatives proved to be unbowed:
“The Senate . agreed on war: the consuls enrolled two armies and marched out through the country of the Marsi and Paeligni. Having collected the army of the Samnites, they established their camp near Capua, where the Latins and their allies had already assembled”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 6: 8).
This route would have taken the Roman armies along the north shore of the Fucine Lake and then south into Samnium and on to Capua. According to Livy (‘History of Rome’, 8: 6: 9), during the night of their arrival there, both consuls had the same dream, in which they learned that the gods would require one of them to sacrifice his life in order to secure a Roman victory. Livy did not say exactly where this camp was located. However:
✴ according to Valerius Maximus, the camp it was located:
“. not far from the foot of Mount Vesuvius”, (‘Of Memorable Things’, 7:3) and
✴ according to Livy, the subsequent battle was fought:
“. not far from the foot of Mount Vesuvius, at the point where the road led off to the [now-unknown stream or river] Veseris”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 8: 19).
Thus, at least according to the sources used by Livy and Valerius Maximus, the battle was fought near the Romans’ first camp, which was below Mount Vesuvius, some 50 km south of Capua.
However, a surviving fragment from Dionysius of Halicarnassus gives an account that obviously relied on other sources, according to which, the consuls and their armies:
“. passed unhindered [along the road that leads from Rome to Campania], with some of the [local] people offering no opposition and others actually escorting them on their way. There were many difficult passes along [this] road . and it was not easy to get through them when the enemy had occupied them in advance. [The Romans] also crossed a river called the Volturnus, which flowed through the territory and city of Casilinum, . by means of a wooden bridge that they constructed in 3 days. They faced these difficulties in order to inspire confidence in those of those Campani that sided with them while . [inspiring] fear in those that did not. When they had advanced beyond the city [Casilinum ?/ Capua ?], they encamped at a distance of 40 stades [about 7 km] from Capua, entrenching themselves in a lofty position, where they waited . for the provisions and reinforcements that they expected from the Samnites: it seems that the Samnites kept promising [much] while furnishing nothing worth mentioning . The consuls, therefore, . resolved to set to work [without them] . ”, (‘Roman Antiquities’, 15: 4: 1-4)
Thus, unlike Livy, Dionysius had the Romans:
✴ march directly to Capua through enemy territory, essentially along the later route of the Via Appia
✴ camp some 7 km from Capua, on a ‘lofty position’ (which presumably means the Monti Tifatini) and
✴ fight the subsequent battle without Samnite reinforcements (an assertion that Livy also found in some of his sources see ‘History of Rome’, 8: 11: 2).
As the battle moved towards its conclusion:
“[The Romans] threw the [Latin] front ranks into disorder and . disposed of the fine flower of their manhood . [leaving] barely a quarter [of them] alive. The Samnites, who were drawn up a little way off, at the foot of the mountain, represented another source of terror to the Latins. But, of all the citizens and allies [who fought in the Roman and Samnite alliance], the chief glory of that war went to the consuls, of whom:
✴ one [Decius] had drawn all the threats and menaces of the . gods upon himself alone and
✴ the other [Manlius] had shown such valour and ability in the battle .
The Latins fled to [the Auruncan stronghold of] Minturnae. Their camp was captured after the battle and many men, chiefly Campani, were caught and slain there”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 10: 5-10).
However, despite Livy’s obvious admiration for this victory, the war was by no means over.
The subsequent battle is mainly remembered in Roman tradition for the facts that:
✴ Manlius enforced army discipline by executing his son for disobeying an order and
✴ Decius sacrificed his life in battle, as portended in the consuls’ dream, in a ritual that the Romans designated as a ‘ devotio ’ (see Stephen Oakley, 1998, at pp. 500-5 ).
I discuss both of these heroic actions below.
Battle at Trifanum (340 BC)
We have two surviving accounts of battles fought by the Romans on Auruncan territory in 340 BC, both of which are much shorter and much less embroidered than Livy’s account of the Battle of the Veseris:
✴ According to Livy himself:
“. the Latins who survived the [Battle of the Veseris] . reunited and took refuge in the [now-unknown Auruncan] town of Vescia. In the councils that they held there, Numisius, their commander . [proposed that they should] speedily recruit [new] fighting men from the Latin and Volscian tribes and return . to Capua, where their unexpected arrival would strike dismay into the Romans. . An army was consequently levied in haste and brought together from every quarter. [Manlius] met this force near [the now-unknown Auruncan centre of] Trifanum, a place situated between Sinuessa and Minturnae. Both armies . [immediately] fell to fighting, and the war was quickly ended: the enemy's strength had been brought so low [in the earlier battle] that, when Manlius led his victorious army to pillage their fields, the Latins all surrendered and the Campani followed their example”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 11: 5-12).
✴ According to Diodorus Siculus:
“The Romans were victorious in a battle against the Latins and Campani in the vicinity of [the Auruncan centre of] Suessa and annexed part of the territory of the vanquished. Manlius, the consul who had won the victory, celebrated a triumph”, (‘Library of History’, 14: 34: 7).
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 430) observed that:
“The equation of these two battles [seems] inevitable: [indeed, this is hardly a matter of conjecture, since] Suessa and Sinuessa were very close together.”
In a passage relating to the events of 337 BC, Livy recorded that:
“The Aurunci had surrendered in the consulship of Titus Manlius and had given no trouble since that time, for which reason they had the . right to expect assistance from the Romans.”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 15: 1-2).
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 572 observed that there is no reason to doubt that the Aurunci did surrender at this time, after which:
“. they were very much in the Roman sphere of influence.”
Surprisingly, Livy did not record the award of a triumph to Manlius, the surviving consul of 340 BC. However:
✴ as noted above, Diodorus recorded that he was awarded a triumph over the Latins and Campani after his victory near Suessa while
✴ the fasti Triumphalis record that his triumph of this year was awarded over the Latins, Campani, Sidicini and Aurunci.
The record in the fasti of the composition of the defeated armies might well be accurate since, as Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 430) observed:
“One effect of the fighting of 340 BC was to detach . the Campani, Sidicini and Aurunci from the [anti-Roman] alliance . ”
That left only the Latins and the Volsci to continue the war.
Land Confiscations (340 BC)
We here no more about Rome’s relations with the Sidicini and Aurunci until 337 BC, when (as described in my page Between First Two Samnite Wars II (337 - 328 BC) ) they were both still independent of Rome (and at war with each other). However, we do hear of the start of a political settlement with the Latins (who remained hostile at this point), the Volsci of Privernum, and the Campani: according to Livy, after their defeat at Trifanum:
“Latium, [the Volsci and Capua were deprived of territory:
✴ the territory of Privernum and
✴ the ager Falernus which had belonged to the populi Campani [people of [ i.e . the people of Capua and its satellites, Atella, Casilinum and Calatia] as far as the river Volturnus
was parcelled out amongst the Roman plebs”, (‘ History of Rome ’, 8: 11: 12-15).
I discuss these in detail in my page on the Political Settlements of 340 - 328 BC .
War with the Latins and the Antiates (340 - 338 BC)
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 430) observed that, with the Campani, Sidicini and Aurunci all defeated, the Roman could concentrate on:
“. campaigns nearer home against the Volsci and the Latins . ”
As far as we know, the Samnites played no part in these Roman campaigns (discussed below), although it is likely that they continued to campaign against the Sidicini and possible that they also campaigned against the Volsci east of the Liris.
In his account of these events, Livy was still at pains to portray the Romans as the aggrieved party. Thus, he claimed that, after Manlius’ return to Rome in 340 BC:
“The Antiates ravaged the lands of Ostia, Ardea and [the now-unknown Latin centre of] Solonium. Since Manlius was unable to conduct this war himself because of ill-health, he appointed Lucius Papirius Crassus (who happened to be praetor at that time) as dictator, and he, in turn, named Lucius Papirius Cursor master of the horse. Papirius accomplished nothing noteworthy against the Antiates, despite having been camped in their territory for some months”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 12: 2-3).
Then, in 339 BC, when Tiberius Aemilius Mamercinus and Quintus Publilius Philo served as consuls:
“The Latins took up arms again, being incensed at the confiscation of their land, and suffered a defeat and the loss of their camp in the [now unknown] campi Fenectani . While Publilius, under whose command and auspices this campaign had been conducted, was receiving the surrender of the Latin peoples whose soldiers had fallen there, Aemilius led his army against Pedum, . [which was] supported by the people of Tibur, Praeneste ,Velitrae, . Lanuvium and Antium. . [When Aemilius heard] that his colleague had been decreed a triumph, left the war [with Pedum and its allies] unfinished [and returned to Rome. . The Senate] denied him a triumph until he should either capture Pedum or receive its surrender [neither of which he achieved]”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 12: 5-9).
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 520) argued that:
“. the triumph of Publilius Philo should [not] be doubted.”
As he pointed out, the fasti Triumphalis record the award of a triumph over the Latins to Philo. However, he suggested that:
“. since the Latins were able to take to the field again in 338 BC, it is perhaps unlikely that Philo received many of them into deditio .”
He also considered that Livy’s account of Aemilius’ behaviour was probably unreliable.
Philo’s Dictatorship and Legislation
“Aemilius, who became estranged from the Senate [because of its its refusal to award him a triumph], thereafter administered his consulship in the spirit of a seditious tribune: throughout the rest of his consulship, he continually accused the senators before the people, while [Philo], since he too was a plebeian, offered not the slightest opposition. The subject of [Aemilius’] accusations was the niggardly apportionment of land in Latium and the ager Falernus to the plebeians. When the Senate, desiring finire imperium consulibus (to limit/end the consuls’ imperium), ordered that a dictator should be appointed to [continue he war in Latium], Aemilius, who then held the fasces , appointed [none other than Philo], his colleague as dictator, and he appointed Junius Brutus as his master of the horse”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 12: 10-13).
Stephen Oakley (referenced below, 1998, at p. 523) noted that Philo’s master of horse was almost certainly D. Junius Brutus Scaeva. (I have tried, unsuccessfully, to find precedents for the Senate requiring the appointment of a dictator in order to limit or end the imperium of the consuls, and for one of the consuls appointing his colleague as dictator and/or appointing a dictator for a purpose other than that which the Senate had proposed.)
14] Publilius was a popular dictator, both because of his denunciation of the senate and because he carried through three laws very advantageous to the plebs and prejudicial to the nobles:
The hostile situation at Pedum remained unresolved until the following year (338 BC), when the new consuls, Lucius Furius Camillus and Caius Maenius:
“. put aside all other matters and set out for that place. [By then, the Latins’ resolve had weakened and] very few cities were able to help Pedum:
✴ the Tiburtes and Praenestini, whose territories lay near by, did reach Pedum but
✴ Maenius attacked and routed the Aricini, Lanuvini and Veliterni as they were joining up with the Volsci from Antium at the river Astura [see below].
Camillus dealt with the very powerful army of the Tiburtes near Pedum the struggle was harder [than that at Antium], but the issue was equally successful. The greatest confusion was occasioned by a sudden sally of the townsfolk during the battle, but Camillus . not only drove them back into their city, but . even took the place by escalade that very day”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 13: 1-7).
Somewhat surprisingly, Livy did not address the circumstances in which Tibur and Praeneste were defeated.
As noted above, according to Livy, while Camillus was engaged at Pedum:
“Maenius attacked and routed the Aricini, Lanuvini and Veliterni as they were joining up with the Volsci from Antium at the river Astura”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 13: 5).
As John Rickard (referenced below) observed:
“The location of [this] battle is something of a puzzle: . Velitrae, Lanuvium and Aricia . were located quite close together to the southeast of Rome, and yet they were defeated on the River Astura, 20 miles further south and just to the east of Antium. The question is: why did those cities move their armies away from Pedum, and not towards it ?”
He put forward a number of possibilities, but there is no knowing which (if any) of them is correct. It seems to me that, since Livy implied that none of the Latins except Tibur and Praeneste were able to help Pedum, the most likely of Rickard’s hypotheses is that:
“. the Roman presence around Pedum might have been strong enough to prevent these three Latin armies from moving north.”
It is also possible that, had they reached the Astura, the Latins would have attempted to outflank the Romans with the help of the Antiates’ powerful fleet.
It is also surprising Livy did not describe the actual battle on the Astura: all he said about it in this chapter was that, at the end of the campaign, Camillus reported to the Senate that:
“The armies of our enemies have been cut to pieces at Pedum and on the Astura all the Latin towns, together with Antium in the land of the Volsci, have either been carried by storm or have made submission, and are in the keeping of your garrisons”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 13: 5).
In the following chapter, he noted that:
“Some of the . ships [captured at Antium] were laid up in the Roman dockyards. Others were burnt, and it was decided that their rostraque (prows) should be used to embellish a dais erected in the Forum. This sacred place [thus] became known as the Rostra”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 14: 11-12).
This platform enjoyed a prominent location in the Forum, and was used for addressing the plebs assembled in either the Forum or the adjacent Comitium. Florus, who was probably writing in the early 2nd century AD, asserted that:
“Spoils won from Antium still exist, which Maenius fixed up on the tribunal of the Forum after the capture of the enemies' fleet ( if it can be called a fleet, for it consisted of only six beaked ships: in those ancient days, however, a fleet of that number was sufficient for a war at sea)”, (‘Epitome of Roman History”, 1: 11: 10).
This suggests that there were six ships’ prows on the Rostra in Florus’ time (although, pace Florus, this gives no indication of the total size of the Antiate fleet that Maenius seized in 338 BC, since the prows came from the ships that the Romans burned rather than preserved).
Final Subjugation of the Latins (338 BC)
Following these two important victories:
“The consuls . resolved . to proceed with their victorious army to the thorough conquest of the Latins nor did they rest until, by storming every city or receiving its surrender, they had brought all Latium under their dominion. Then, distributing garrisons amongst the recovered towns, they departed for Rome, to enjoy the triumph . [and] were granted the honour (a rare one in those days) of equestrian statues put up in the Forum”, (‘History of Rome’, 8: 13: 1-9).
The fasti Triumphalis record the award of triumphs to:
✴ Furius, over the Pedani and Tiburtes and
✴ Maenius, over the Antiates, Lavinii [ sic ?] and Veliterni.
If Livy is correct in recording that:
✴ Maenius had defeated the Aricini, Lanuvini and Veliterni and
✴ the Laurentes (people of Lavinium) had not participated in the war (see also the discussion below)
then the engraver of the fasti must have meant Lanuvini (people of Lanuvium) rather than Lavini (particularly since the people from Lavinium were more usually referred to as Laurentes).
J. C. Yardley (translation) and D. Hoyos (introduction and notes), “Livy: Rome's Italian Wars: Books 6-10”, (2013), Oxford World's Classics
J. Rickard, “Battle of Asturia (338 BC)”, (2009) Military History Encyclopedia (on line)
S. Oakley, “ A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X:Volume II: Books VII and VIII ”, (1998) Oxford
S. Oakley, “ A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X:Volume I: Introduction and Book VI ”, (1997) Oxford
T. Cornell, “ The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (ca. 1000-264 BC) ”, (1995) London and New York
11. Chandragupta Maurya (340 BC–298 BC, India)
Chandragupta was the founder of the Maurya Empire and a Kshatriya varna ruler. He reunited India into a single sub-continent. Chandragupta is usually considered the first historical emperor of India. Before Chandragupta, India was divided into small private kingdoms. He conquered all these small kingdoms and created a central government and a unified central kingdom.
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Macedonian Wars, (3rd and 2nd centuries bc ), four conflicts between the ancient Roman Republic and the kingdom of Macedonia. They caused increasing involvement by Rome in Greek affairs and helped lead to Roman domination of the entire eastern Mediterranean area.
The First Macedonian War (215–205 bc ) occurred in the context of the Second Punic War, while Rome was preoccupied with fighting Carthage. The ambitious Macedonian king Philip V set out to attack Rome’s client states in neighbouring Illyria and confirmed his purpose in 215 by making an alliance with Hannibal of Carthage against Rome. The Romans fought the ensuing war ineffectively, and in 205 the Peace of Phoenice ended the conflict on terms favourable to Philip, allowing him to keep his conquests in Illyria.
Philip then began harrying Rhodes, Pergamum, and other Greek city-states of the Aegean. The Second Macedonian War (200–196) was launched by the Roman Senate against Philip after he refused to guarantee to make no hostile moves against these states. Philip’s forces were badly defeated by the Romans and their Greek allies in a battle at Cynoscephalae in 197. The terms of peace included the loss of most of his navy, payment of a large indemnity to Rome, and the loss of his territories outside of Macedonia. Rome subsequently established a benevolent protectorate over Greece.
Philip’s son and successor, Perseus (reigned 179–168), began to make alliances with various Greek city-states and thus aroused the displeasure of Rome. So began the Third Macedonian War (171–168), which ended in 168 when the Roman army of Lucius Aemilius Paullus utterly defeated Perseus’ forces at the Battle of Pydna. Perseus was taken back to Rome in chains, and Macedonia was broken up into four formally autonomous republics that were required to pay annual tribute to Rome. This arrangement produced a state of chronic disorder in Macedonia, however, and in 152 a pretended son of Perseus, Andriscus, tried to reestablish the Macedonian monarchy, thus provoking the Fourth Macedonian War (149–148). The Roman praetor Quintus Caecilius Metellus crushed the rebellion with relative ease, and in 146 Macedonia was made a Roman province. It was in fact the first province of the nascent Roman Empire.
Alexander the Great in battle on his horse, Bucephalas © Throughout his life Alexander was exceptionally preoccupied with his image, both literally and metaphorically. One of his non-Greek protégés appreciated this very well and had himself buried in a stone coffin, now in the Archaeological Museum, Istanbul, adorned with images showing Alexander hunting either a human or animal prey.
The strikingly well preserved artefact is known as the 'Alexander Sarcophagus', for the good reason that on one long side a figure unambiguously meant to be Alexander is depicted on horseback, in vigorous and deadly combat against a Persian.
The horse in question was Bucephalas (the name means Ox-Head), a magnificent - and prodigiously expensive - Thessalian stallion, probably named for the shape of the white blaze on his muzzle. It was alleged that only Alexander had been able to break the horse in, and he became so attached to the animal over the next two decades or so that he actually named a city - Bucephala - after him, in an area now part of modern Pakistan (site unidentified).
Throughout his life Alexander was exceptionally preoccupied with his image, both literally and metaphorically.
The scenes on the short sides of the Alexander Sarcophagus depict the hunting of lions and panthers. Traditionally, the coffin has been attributed to Abdalonymus, king of Sidon, and the sources record that Abdalonymus received his appointment from Alexander through the good offices of another of Alexander's most devoted companions, his friend from boyhood and alter-ego, Hephaestion. But an alternative interpretation attributes the sarcophagus rather to the much more important Mazaeus.
This man was a noble Persian, whom Alexander appointed to govern Babylon after he had transferred his allegiance from the defeated Persian great king Darius III, following the decisive battle of Gaugamela (331 BC). Whichever interpretation is correct, the relatives and friends of the dead occupant knew well how best to honour a close lifetime association with the Nimrod of ancient Greece, the mighty hunter Alexander.
Tota Italia III
A spear sacred to Mars was laid upon the ground and Mus stood upon it. Denter helped the consul recite the terrible prayer of devotio, the same with which the original Decius Mus had devoted himself at Battle of the Veseris. It is possible that Livy or his sources invented this, but it seems likely that it derives from pontifical or other priestly records of religious formulae:
Janus, Jupiter, Father Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, Lares, divine Novensiles, divine Indigites, you gods in whose power are both we and the enemy, and you, divine Manes, I invoke and worship you, I beg and crave your favour, that you prosper the might and victory of the Roman people and visit on their enemies fear, shuddering and death. As I have pronounced these words on behalf of the Republic of the Roman people, and of the army and the legions and auxiliaries . . . I devote the legions and auxiliaries of the enemy, along with myself, to the divine Manes and Tellus.
The younger Mus added some grim imprecations to this vow of death:
I will drive before me fear and panic, blood and carnage. The wrath of the heavenly gods and the infernal gods will curse the standards, weapons and armour of the enemy, and in the same place as I die witness the destruction of the Gauls and Samnites!
Denter helped Mus don the ritualistic garb of the devotus. This was the cinctus Gabinius, a toga hitched in such a way that a man could ride a horse and wield a weapon. The consul was ready to meet his destiny, but first proclaimed Denter propraetor (he had been consul in 302 BC). Thus invested with imperium, Denter assumed command of the consular army.
Brandishing the spear of Mars, Mus spurred his way through the broken antesignani, charged into the ranks of the advancing Senones and impaled himself on their weapons. The death of a general, the focus of command and authority and leadership, usually triggered the collapse of an army, but the news of Mus’ glorious demise, transmitted by Denter, rallied the hard-pressed Roman infantry and they turned on their opponents with renewed vigour. According to Livy, Mus’ heroic death had the effect of instantly paralyzing the seemingly victorious Gauls:
From that moment the battle seemed scarce to depend on human efforts. The Romans, after losing a general – an occurrence that is wont to inspire terror – fled no longer, but sought to redeem the field. The Gauls, especially those in the press around the body of the consul, as though deprived of reason, were darting their javelins at random and without effect, while some were in a daze, and could neither fight nor run away.
The Senones’ reaction seems entirely fantastic but is it entirely fictitious? Is it merely the over-egged reconstruction of a patriotic Roman historian or does it have some basis in reality? Livy was keen to describe how the self-sacrifice of Mus brought on the aid of Tellus and Manes and the form that aid took, but were the Senones aware they had killed a devotus? It is possible that they did, and their reaction, although exaggerated, was one of shock and caused their advance to halt.
It was suggested above that the Picentes chose alliance with Rome rather than with the Samnite-led coalition because of their hatred of the Senones. The Senones had encroached on the lands of the proud Picentes for more than a century. The Picentes famously took their name from the sacred picus of Mamers that had led them to the east of the Appenines. The association with Mamers/Mars is underlined by considerable archaeological finds of arms and armour that demonstrate the martial nature of ancient Picenum. They were talented smiths, developing elaborate ‘pot’ helmets and the original Negau-type which were adopted throughout Italy in the sixth and fifth centuries BC and employed by Italic mercenaries serving abroad, for example in Sicily. The ‘Woodpeckers’ did lose a portion of their northern territory to the Senones, but their success in halting the Gallic advance and holding the remaining country testifies to their military prowess. There is also evidence to suggest that the Picentes knew of the ritual of devotio and employed it in battle.
In an excursus about devotio following his account of the Veseris, Livy notes that a Roman commander could nominate an ordinary legionary to take his place and die among the enemy. This substitution would eliminate the possibility of the Roman army panicking at the death of its commander, and volunteers were probably not difficult to find. The honour falling on the family of a successful devotus would be immense. The use of substitutes should lead us to suspect that devotiones were more common occurrences than the sources suggest, but only the successful devotiones of great men entered the written record.
Devotio or devotio-like practices were not unique to the Romans and Latins, and if the enemy realized that a devotus was seeking death, every effort would be made to capture the man alive (cf. the orders of Pyrrhus at Ausculum, below). If the devotus, whether a general or a common soldier, failed to die, an expiatory offering had to be made to the gods cheated of the promised sacrifice of the devotus and the enemy soldiers. A 7 feet tall statue of the failed devotus was buried in the ground and a victim sacrificed over it. Likewise, if the devotus was unsuccessful and lost to the enemy the spear sacred to Mars, a pig, sheep or an ox was sacrificed to placate the god.
In 1934 the limestone statue of an Italic warrior was discovered buried in a vineyard near Capestrano. It had not toppled to the ground and gradually been covered over with soil, but was deliberately buried, like a body in a grave. The back of the statue remained in perfect condition, suggesting that it was buried immediately after its production, around 500 BC. The statue is 7 feet tall. The figure wears typical central Italian body armour, the details of which are emphasized with paint: a bronze gorget and disc cuirass, a broad bronze belt and an apron to protect his vulnerable abdomen. His arms are crossed over his chest and he clutches a short sword and a small axe, while javelins with throwing thongs are carved on the vertical supports that hold up the figure. Capestrano is located in what was the territory of the Vestini, but the warrior wears a broad-brimmed Picene helmet with a great crest and the inscription on the statue, not yet deciphered, is in a southern Picene dialect. It has been suggested that the Capestrano Warrior represents a very high status – his rich panoply was far beyond the means of a common soldier – but failed devotus.
If the Capestrano Warrior does represent a devotus, it would demonstrate that the Picentes employed devotio. We can postulate that a Picene devotio was essentially similar to a Roman devotio: the king, general or lower-ranking substitute invoking the gods, vowing to sacrifice himself and the forces of the enemy, followed by the donning of ritual costume or armour and the lone charge to the death. The opponents against whom the Picentes were most likely to employ this ritual tactic were the Senonian Gauls.
If the Senones were familiar with devotio or similar practices from warfare against the Picentes and other Italian peoples, the warriors at Sentinum would have recognized the features of devotio in Mus’ suicidal charge. The realization that they had unwittingly carried out a sacrifice that would set the gods against them could well have caused their advance to falter. The impact of the divine on ancient Italian warfare should not be underestimated. This was an intensely religious and superstitious age, and even if the Senones were unsure about which gods were being called on to aid the Romans (by this time the Gauls had probably adopted a considerable number of native Italian deities), they recognized ritual practice, knew the powers and whims of the gods and they would have known fear and panic.
That Mus’ antesignani rallied on witnessing his death demonstrates they had been forewarned that their general might devote himself and, if so, not to panic but rejoice, for the enemy would be doomed. The situation was reversed: Romans turned to pursue Senones, but the Gallic warriors had recovered some of their composure and did not flee pell-mell as the Roman cavalry had. They halted and organized themselves into a strong testudo formation. Like the Romans, the Gauls protected themselves with tall shields, well-suited to form the walls and roof of the testudo (‘tortoise’). The testudo is famous from later Roman warfare. If it remained unbroken, it provided excellent protection against missiles and cavalry. Marc Antony’s extraordinary retreat from Parthia in 36 BC was facilitated by use of the marching testudo. The chieftains of the Senones were experienced enough as commanders to realize the dangers of flight from battle – most casualties occurred during the pursuit of broken troops by cavalry. If they could last out the day in the testudo, they should be able to retreat safely under the cover of night. Of course, they may still have hoped for victory. The Samnites continued to fight on the left and if Rullianus was defeated, they would come to the relief of their Gallic allies.
The battle on the Roman right went as Rullianus had predicted. Gellius Egnatius launched his warriors in furious charges at the hastati, but the Romans and allies held firm. The classic Roman infantry formation, that is, the three ordines of maniples (triplex acies), was designed for mobility and attack, the maniples separated by considerable intervals and acting like miniature attack columns. However, one wonders how suitable this open battle formation was to Rullianus’ defensive, and presumably static, tactics.
The intervals between the maniples of ‘heavy’ infantry (not really an appropriate description but nonetheless useful) were protected by bands of ‘light’ troops called rorarii. Known by the end of the third century BC as velites (‘swift ones’), these were the poorest and usually youngest troops. There were even poorer Roman and Latin citizens, proletarii, who were generally exempt from military service, but the rorarii had at least the means to afford a bundle of light javelins, a sword, shield and helmet. They could not afford body armour. The rorarii fought in swarms, they were not led by centurions and signiferi (standard-bearers), but relied on their own initiative. Before the main battle lines enagaged, they would skirmish in front of the army, using hit-and-run tactics to thin the leading ranks of the enemy or to provoke him into a rash and disorderly attack. The later velites, and perhaps the earlier rorarii as well, wore wolf skins over their helmets to make them conspicuous to senior officers who would take note of acts of valour. Having considerable freedom of movement, these light troops were encouraged to engage in single combat and were eligible for particular military awards (dona militaria). When the main battle lines came up, the rorarii would retreat to the intervals between the maniples: any enemies advancing into the tempting gap would be stung by their light javelins. It is conceivable that attackers also risked being caught in a ‘crossfire’ of pila from the legionaries in the outside files of the maniples to either side, and that the maniple in the following line, positioned to cover the gap, would charge forward. Samnites were notable for the speed of their charges. Lightly equipped – most Samnite warriors were protected by only a scutum (a shield) a helmet, and armed with a couple of dual-purpose thrusting and throwing spears or pila – they could rush the intervals and force their way into the flanks and rears of the maniples. Rullianus, who knew too well the devastating effect of the swift Samnite onslaught from Lautulae, may have arranged his maniples of hastati without the usual intervals, allowing them to form a continuous wall of shields on which the Samnites could exhaust their missiles, energy and resolve.
The hastati would not break and at length the war cries, javelin volleys and charges of Gellius Egnatius’ warriors waned. Rullianus judged the time was ripe to attack. He ordered the prefects commanding the cavalry turmae to work their way forward and be ready to attack the left flank of Egnatius’ army. This suggests that whatever cavalry the Samnite general had was sufficiently weakened or had already retired from the action. The consul then gave the order for the infantry to advance, but this was not yet an all-out charge, only a probe he was still wary and needed to confirm that the enemy were indeed exhausted. The Samnite maniples were pushed back easily. Rullianus called up reserves he had deliberately held back for this moment. It is uncertain if these were combined legionary and allied principes and/or triarii, or just allied cohorts, nor is it made clear where he positioned them, but in combination with the legionaries they delivered the hammer blow that caused Egnatius’ army to break. Rullianus gave the signal, by trumpet, and the infantry drove forward. Simultaneously the Roman cavalry charged at the Samnites’ left flank. The physically exhausted and demoralized Samnites cracked and they fled back to the confederate camp, easy prey for the swift Roman cavalry. The flight of the Samnites meant that the Senones, still holding out in their testudo, were completely exposed and the Romans hastened to encircle them.
Meanwhile, Livius Denter was busy riding along the ranks of Mus’ army shouting out that the consul had devoted himself, thus making victory certain:
The Gauls and the Samnites, he said, were made over to Tellus and to the Manes. Decius was haling after him with their devoted host and calling it to join him, and with the enemy all was madness and despair.
The arrival of Scipio Barbatus and Marcius Rutilus with reinforcements from Rullianus’ ‘rearmost battle line’, presumably triarii, also helped to rally Mus’ army. On learning of Mus’ sacrifice the former consuls resolved to ‘dare all for the republic’ and destroy the Senones’ testudo. Orders were given to collect up all the pila, javelins and spears littering the battlefield, and to bombard the enemy. Initially, the volleys of missiles had little effect, but gradually javelins found their way through small gaps in the wall and roof of shields. Injured warriors dropped their shields and the front of the testudo was gradually opened up.
Rullianus, now aware of Mus’ death, broke off his pursuit of Egnatius’ men and crossed the river to attack the Gallic tortoise. He sent 500 of his picked Campanian horsemen, followed by the principes of the Third Legion, to circle around the testudo and to make a surprise assault on its rear. ‘Make havoc of them in their panic,’ he told his men. The unexpected charge of the Campanian turmae succeeded in opening gaps in the enemy formation. The 1,200 principes forced their way through the openings and split the tortoise apart. Rullianus then returned to the pursuit of Egnatius. Such was the crush at the gates of the camp that many warriors were unable to enter. Gellius Egnatius rallied these men and formed a battle line to meet Rullianus.
On approaching the camp the consul called on the great god Jupiter, in his guise as the Victor. Victory was now certain, but the Roman general knew how dangerous Egnatius and his men would be as they made their last stand. We may also assume that it was late in the day and Rullianus feared that a considerable portion of the enemy would escape under the cover of night, so he vowed to the god a temple and the spoils of battle in return for a complete victory. It seemed to the Romans that Jupiter heard Rullianus, for Egnatius was cut down and his men were quickly swept aside. The Romans and allies then surrounded the enemy camp. The Senones, assailed from front and rear, were annihilated. The Battle of the Nations was over.
The Samnites and Senones lost 25,000 men that day – less than Livy’s favourite and exaggerated casualty figure of 30,000 and therefore probably reasonably accurate. Another 8,000 were taken captive, probably mostly those Samnites who had made it into the apparent safety of the camp. At least 5,000 Samnites did escape, but as they headed for home via the territory of the Paeligni, they were attacked. The Paeligni, now of course allies of Rome, killed 1,000 of the Samnite fugitives. Some Gallic infantry might have made good their escape from Sentinum, but most of the warriors in the testudo must have been either killed or enslaved – supposing that they were given the opportunity to surrender. It is uncertain what happened to the Senonian cavalry and chariots. Did the former rally when Mus’ squadrons were panicked by the unexpected attack of the charioteers, or did they continue their flight? Likewise, what happened to the charioteers? Some presumably continued the pursuit of the broken Roman cavalry, but did those that forced their way into the infantry retire before the Romans rallied?
As we have seen, Livy was usually reticent about listing Roman casualties but for Sentinum he made an exception. This was, after all, the greatest battle yet fought by Rome and her losses served to underline the scale and importance of the struggle. Rullianus’ casualties were relatively light, 1,700 killed, but Mus’ army was severely mauled with 7,000 killed. Sentinum was no easy victory and it was not even the decisive battle of the Third Samnite War. The Samnites would continue the struggle for five more years, and the Etruscans and other peoples remained troublesome, but never again would Rome be faced with such a dangerous coalition of Italian peoples. It also served to bring Rome to the notice of the wider Mediterranean world. The city-states and kingdoms of the Greek East, focussed on the titanic struggles of the Successors of Alexander the Great had, with the exceptions of Magna Graecia and Carthage, paid little attention to events in the West, but now they took note of the new and powerful player on the scene.
Rullianus sent soldiers to search for the body of Decius Mus, but it was not found until the following day. Like his father at the Veseris, Mus was finally discovered under a heap of enemy dead. His corpse was carried to the Roman camp and there was great lamentation. Rullianus immediately oversaw the funeral of his colleague, ‘with every show of honour and well-deserved eulogisms,’ says Livy. Zonaras, whose account derives from Dio, adds that Mus was cremated but this seems to be based on the assumption that the consul’s body was burned with the spoils. In fulfilment of his vow Rullianus had the spoils gathered from the enemy, piled up and burned in offering to Jupiter the Victor. However, only a proportion was given over to the god the rest was reserved for his legionaries. Rullinaus would have carried Mus’ remains back to Rome to be handed over to the Decii for deposit in the family tomb, but it has been suggested that a grave discovered under the altar of the temple of Victoria in Rome belongs to Mus, and that he was honoured with burial there when Postumius Megellus dedicated the temple in 294 BC. The year in which Rullianus dedicated his temple to Jupiter the Victor is not known, but the day and month on which the event occurred is recorded: 13 April, perhaps the anniversary of the day on which the vow was made.
Rullianus crossed back over the Apennines, leaving Decius Mus’ army to keep watch in Etruria (we do not know whom he left in command), and returned to Rome with his legions. On 4 September he celebrated a triumph over Samnites, Gauls and Etruscans. The inclusion of the latter people may be an error. Following his triumph Rullianus was recalled to Etruria to put down the rebellion of Perusia and later historians may have coupled this victory together with the Sentinum campaign. Another explantion is that Rullianus did triumph over Etruscans as well as Gauls and Samnites because he was able to take the credit for Fulvius Centumalus’ victory over the Perusini and Clusini. Centumalus was, after all, following Rullianus’ orders and fighting under his auspices. The triumphing legionaries were each rewarded eighty-two bronze asses (either ingots or rudimentary coins) and a tunic and sagum (military cloak) from the spoils not dedicated to Jupiter the Victor. The garments would have been those stripped from the enemy and we can imagine that the finely-made, colourful and embroidered garments of Senone and Samnite nobles were highly prized.
While Rullianus and Mus were campaigning in Etruria and Umbria, Volumnius Flamma was operating in Samnium. Livy reports that the proconsul drove a Samnite army up Mount Tifernus and, despite the difficulties of the terrain he defeated this army and caused its troops to scatter. The circumstances of this victory are uncertain. Did the proconsul defeat a Samnite force that was about to invade Campania, or did he invade Samnium in order to prevent reinforcements from being sent to Gellius Egnatius? Late in the year, seemingly after Rullianus’ triumph, Samnite legions attacked the territory of Aesernia in the upper valley of the Volturnus, while others marched down the Liris, simply ignored the new small citizen colony at Minturnae and ravaged the country around Formiae and Vescia. Aesernia was located a little to the north of Mount Tifernus, but we do not know when the Romans captured it. The strategically positioned stronghold probably changed hands many times, and Volumnius Flamma may have captured it following his recent victory on Mount Tifernus. By this time the Decian army, as the survivors of Decius Mus’ force were known, had left Etruria and returned to Rome probably to be formally disbanded. The withdrawal of the army encouraged Perusia to take up arms, but Rullianus hastened to the north (with his Sentinum legions?) and inflicted a sound defeat on the Etruscans. Livy reports 4,500 of the enemy killed and, most interestingly, that the 1,740 taken captive were not sold as slaves but ransomed back to their families and clans for 310 asses each. This was presumably conceived of as a swifter way to make a profit from the spoils and perhaps also to deliberately empty the coffers of Perusia and hamper the city’s future war efforts.
The praetor Appius Claudius assumed command of the Decian army and marched south along the road he had built to drive the Samnite raiders from the Auruncan country. The Samnites withdrew before him and combined forces with their comrades who had advanced down the Volturnus from Aesernia to Caiatia. Flamma, probably based around Capua, joined his legions with those of Appius at Caiatia and together they defeated the Samnites. It was a typically bitter engagement but Livy’s casualty figures may be exaggerated – 16,300 Samnites killed and 2,700 taken captive. The number of Roman dead also amounted to 2,700. Appius lost a few more men during the course of the campaign but not to enemy action these unfortunates were struck by lightning.
Livy ends his account of the year 295 BC with a stirring tribute, but not to the devotus Mus or the triumphator Rullianus Livy praises the courage and tenacity of the Samnites, the greatest of Rome’s opponents:
The Samnite wars are still with us, those wars which I have been occupied with through these last four books, and which have gone on continuously for 46 years, in fact ever since the consuls, Marcus Valerius [Corvus] and Aulus Cornelius [Cossus Arvina], carried the arms of Rome for the first time into Samnium. It is unnecessary now to recount the numberless defeats which overtook both nations, and the toils which they endured through all those years, and yet these things were powerless to break down the resolution or crush the spirit of that people I will only allude to the events of the past year. During that period the Samnites, fighting sometimes alone, sometimes in conjunction with other nations, had been defeated by Roman armies under Roman generals on four several occasions, at Sentinum, amongst the Paeligni, at Tifernum, and in the Stellate plains [= Caiatia] they had lost the most brilliant general they ever possessed they now saw their allies – Etruscans, Umbrians, Gauls – overtaken by the same fortune that they had suffered they were unable any longer to stand either in their own strength or in that afforded by foreign arms. And yet they would not abstain from war so far were they from being weary of defending their liberty, even though unsuccessfully, that they would rather be worsted than give up trying for victory. What sort of a man must he be who would find the long story of those wars tedious, though he is only narrating or reading it, when they failed to wear out those who were actually engaged in them?
The Samnites had suffered painful defeats but as Livy emphasizes, they would not give up the fight. Rumours reached Rome that the Samnites had levied three new armies: one to continue the work of Gellius Egnatius and link up with allies in Etruria, another to devastate Campania, while the last would guard Samnium. The rumours were only partly correct. Rather than return to Etruria, early in 294 BC the Samnites seized part of the Marsian territory and installed a powerful garrison in Milionia. This stronghold, the precise location of which is unknown, probably straddled part of the Romans’ usual route to the Adriatic coast. The consuls of 294 BC, Postumius Megellus and Marcus Atilius Regulus (probably the son of the consul of 335 BC), were both assigned Samnium as their ‘province’, that is their sphere of operations, but Megellus fell seriously ill and remained in Rome until August. Regulus invaded northwest Samnium but his route of advance was blocked by a Samnite army. Unable even to forage he was contained in his camp and early one morning, taking advantage of thick fog, the Samnites made a daring raid. Dispatching unsuspecting sentries, they entered the camp by its rear gate, killed Regulus’ quaestor Opimius Pansa and more than 700 legionary and allied troops (Livy reports the presence of a Lucanian cohort and Latin colonists from Suessa Aurunca). Regulus was forced to retreat back to the territory of Sora. The Samnites followed, but dispersed when Megellus finally joined his colleague at Sora sometime after 1 August (on that day the consul is recorded as dedicating his temple to Victoria in Rome). Megellus proceeded to besiege Milionia, while Regulus marched to relieve Luceria. Regulus’ luck did not improve in Apulia. The Samnite army met him at the frontier of Luceria’s territory, defeated him in battle and his legions and cohorts retreated into their fortified camp. The following day, only after much cajoling by the consul, senior officers and centurions, was the army persuaded to resume the fight. It seemed that the Romans would again be defeated, but Regulus’ loud declarations that he had vowed a temple to Jupiter Stator (‘the Stayer’) in exchange for victory, and the exemplary leadership of the centurions, encouraged the Romans, who enveloped the Samnites and finally won the fight. The surviving Samnites, 7,800 in number, were not enslaved but stripped and forced under the yoke. They were defeated and humiliated but free to return to Samnium. Regulus was now keen to return to Rome and claim the right to triumph. On route, he intercepted and slaughtered Samnite raiders in the territory of Intermna Lirenas (the Samnites were perhaps making their way down to northern Campania), but when the Senate learned that he had lost almost 8,000 men in the two-day battle near Luceria and, even worse, that he had let the enemy go free, his request for a triumph was rejected.
The Senate and some of the plebeian tribunes who represented the People also denied Postumius Megellus’ request for a triumph, but the arrogant and unconventional patrician held one anyway on 27 March 293 BC, perhaps suggesting that he campaigned through the winter months. He had, after all, stormed Milionia, killed 3,200 Samnites and enslaved another 4,700 he captured another Marsian (or Samnite) town called Feritrum and enriched his troops with booty advancing into Etruria he defeated the army of Volsinii and then he captured Rusellae, no mere hill fort or town like the strongholds of the Aequi or Samnites, but a great fortress city. It had been more than a century since the Romans last captured such a city (Veii). The Etruscans had believed their cities impregnable and the war in Etruria lasted so long simply because the Etruscans could retreat behind their strong walls, just as the army of Volsinii did in 294 BC when defeated in the field by Megellus. It is to be regretted that no details of how exactly Megellus captured Rusellae survive we know far, far more about the capture of obscure Milionia. However, such was the shock and surprise at his conquest of Rusellae that Volsinii, Perusia and Arretium sued for peace. On supplying the consul’s soldiers with clothing and grain, the Etruscans were permitted to seek terms from the Senate. They were granted truces of forty years’ duration, but each state was forced to immediately pay an indemnity of 500,000 asses. Readers will recall that Fabius Rullianus had extracted 539,400 asses from Perusia in ransoms in the previous year.
Opportunity SeizedModel of Megiddo, 1457 BC.
Having set up camp at the end of the day, Thutmose then advanced his forces under cover of night. While the Kadeshi concentrated their troops around the fortress, Pharaoh spread his out. Two wings menaced the enemy flanks, while the core of the army advanced in the center. In the morning, he attacked.
The two sides were evenly matched in numbers, with around 10,000 infantry and 1,000 chariots each. But having spread out his forces, Pharaoh was better able to make use of his numbers. While he led the attack in the center, his left wing made a fast, aggressive strike against the rebel flank.
The will of the rebel flank was quickly broken by the speed and skill of the Egyptian attack. The right wing crumbled, and the rest of the army swiftly followed, morale collapsing as warriors saw their comrades flee. Some ran into the city, closing the gates behind them to keep the Egyptians out.
The Egyptians now wasted the opportunity swift victory had given them. Like so many victors throughout history, they set about plundering the enemy camp, capturing 200 suits of armor and 924 chariots. But while they did this the scattered rebels found their way back into Megiddo, climbing up improvised ropes of clothing lowered by people inside the walls. Those who made it to safety included the kings of Megiddo and Kadesh.
existence every day. For my own part I reject these doctrines altogether but still I could wish that Democritus, whom every one else applauds, had not been vilified by Epicurus who took him as his sole guide.
VII. “Turn next to the second division of philosophy, Formal Logic he discarded altogether the department of Method and of Dialectic, which is termed Logikē. Of the whole armour of Logic your founder, as it seems to me, is absolutely destitute. He does away with Definition he has no doctrine of Division or Partition a he gives no rules for Deduction or Syllogistic Inference, and imparts no method for resolving Dilemmas or for detecting Fallacies of Equivocation. The Criteria of reality he places in sensation once let the senses accept as true something that is false, and every possible criterion of truth and falsehood seems to him to be immediately destroyed.…
. b He lays the very greatest stress upon that his Ethical Hedonism is contrary to fact: men do not aim solely at Pleasure which, as he declares, Nature herself decrees and sanctions, that is the feelings of pleasure and pain. These he maintains lie at the root of every act of choice and of avoidance. This is the doctrine of Aristippus, and it is upheld more cogently and more frankly by the Cyrenaics but nevertheless it is in my judgment a doctrine in the last degree unworthy of the dignity of man. Nature, in my opinion at all events, has created and endowed us for higher ends. I may possibly be mistaken but I am absolutely convinced that the Torquatus who first won that surname did not wrest the famous necklet from his foe in the hope of getting from it any physical enjoyment, nor did he fight the battle of the Veseris against the Latins in his third consulship for the sake
Historical Timeline: Pre-1900
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Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times p. 6, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times p. 11, Princeton University Press, 1992
Emmanuel Anati, "The Prehistory of the Holy Land (until 3200 B.C.," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 32, The Continuum Publishing Group, 2001
It is not yet clear how the Chalcolithic cultures came to an end. Late in the fourth millennium, important northern cultural influences penetrated the holy Land, and a new culture was born. But the old traditions did not perish overnight, and co-existed with the new ones in the earliest levels of the Bronze Age."
Emmanuel Anati, "The Prehistory of the Holy Land (until 3200 B.C.," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 32, 34, The Continuum Publishing Group, 2001
Hanoch Reviv, "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 B.C.)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 36, The Continuum Publishing Group, 2001
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 33, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 53-54, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 63-64, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 94, Princeton University Press, 1992
The warlike tendencies of the Amorite successor states are clearly reflected in the town architecture of MB IIA and B. To accommodate an increase in population -- the population of Palestine in MB IIA [1950 - 1750 B.C.] has been estimated at 100,000, that of MB IIB [1750 - 1600 B.C.] at 140,000 -- cities were enlarged and fortifications introduced.
On gains the distinct impression that by the end of MBIIA [1750 B.C.] Palestine and southern Syria had been irrevocably drawn into the ambit of the warring Amorite states of the north and east, and hence obliged to adopt a more hostile stance toward Egypt."
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 94-96, Princeton University Press, 1992
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 189, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
"The degree of Hyksos control over the land whence they had emerged remains problematical. Design scarabs dubbed 'Hyksos' simply because they are ubiquitous in Egypt and Palestine during the period of the 15th Dynasty [1664 - 1555 B.C.] may or may not be proof of political rule: at most they attest to the presence of a sort of cultural penumbra."
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 119, Princeton University Press, 1992
"Whether anything more than a sphere of interest should be postulated beyond the Sinai for the Hyksos dynasty is difficult to say at present…The Hazor regime [Amorites] would have maintained its powerful position through most, if not all, the Hyksos period…We can only assume Hazor's continued hegemony would have blocked Hyksos attempts to expand their control northward [into Palestine]."
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 121, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 137-138, Princeton University Press, 1992
"The expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt marks the end of the Middle Bronze Age. With the emergence of the Mitanni kingdom as well as the growing power of the Egyptian Eighteenth Dynasty, a new era began in the history of Syria-Palestine."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 217, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Hanoch Reviv, "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 B.C.)," The History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 44 The Continuum Publishing Group Inc. 2001
"The immediate aftermath of the Egyptian conquest involved the intentional demolition of Canaanite towns and the deportation of a sizable segment of the population. Thutmose III [1504 - 1452 B.C.] carried off in excess of 7,300, while his son Amenophis II [1454 - 1419 B.C.] uprooted by his own account 89,600."
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 208, Princeton University Press, 1992
"Ever since the great deportations of Thutmose III and Amenophis II, the northern empire and Palestine especially had suffered a weakening brought on by under population. Not only did the 'apiru banditry now take advantage of the vacuum in the highlands, but nomads from Transjordan also began to move north into Galilee and Syria and west across the Negev to Gaza, Ashkelon, and the highway linking Egypt with Palestine."
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 179, Princeton University Press, 1992
"The 'apiru and the nomads (Shasu) are the people that the Egyptians, according to the inscriptions of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth dynasties, met in Palestine. These are therefore the ancestors of many of the 'tribes' of the central hill country that we later meet in the biblical narratives about the period of the so-called Judges."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 236, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 275, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 266, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 280, Princeton University Press, 1992
Wolfram von Soden, The Ancient Orient: An Introduction to the Study of the Ancient Near East , p. 55, William B. Eardmans Publishing Co, 1994
Hanoch Reviv, "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 B.C.)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 67, G.G. The Jerusalem Publishing House Ltd., 2001
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 298, Princeton University Press, 1992
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 295-296, Princeton University Press, 1992
"The Hebrew-Philistine rivalry for the possession of the land provided the occasion for the creation of the Hebrew monarchy. Saul's anointment (c. 1020 B.C.) as the first king was tantamount to a challenge to Philistine suzerainty."
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 96, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
"With most of Transjordan and the central hills of Cisjordan [land west of the Jordan river] north of the Jebusite city state of Jerusalem under his control, Saul had created a territorial state that the greater Palestinian region had never seen before. Saul can therefore be regarded as the first state-builder in Palestine."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 449, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria , p. 187, Macmillan & Co. LTD., 1951
Meir Ben-Dov, Historical Atlas of Jerusalem , p. 44, Continuum Press, 2000
Dilip Hiro, The Essential Middle East , "Jerusalem", Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 487-488, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 97, 99, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
"The little southern state [Judah] was more or less limited to the tribal portions of Judah, Simean and Benjamin, with some possessions in Edom in the east and along the coastal plain in the west. In the north there was the kingdom of Israel, with Shechem as its fist capital, larger than Judah both in population and in size. Encompassing the portions of a majority of the tribes and the most fertile parts of the country, including the Sharon, it retained Moab, and apparently Ammon as well, as vassal-states."
Hanoch Reviv, "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 B.C.)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 81, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc. 2001
"The two tiny kingdoms fell into the complex political and belligerent developments of the general area and became rivals, at times enemies. Repeated uprisings and mounting intrigues in both states contributed to their final undoing. Israel experienced nine dynastic changes, involving nineteen kings, in its two-century existence. The throne of Judah was occupied by twenty kings, but the southern kingdom out lived the northern by about a century and a third. The way was paved for their final destruction one by Assyria and the other by Neo-Babylonia."
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 97, 99, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times , p. 340-341, Princeton University Press, 1992
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 630-631, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
"For Palestine the result of the Assyrian campaign in 734-732 B.C. was a greatly devastated country. Its population had been decimated not only through war casualties but also through deportations… Another result was that the Assyrian empire now reached down through the Galilee and the Jezreel and Beth-shan valleys to the Philistine coast in Palestine, and in Transjordan down to the border of Ammon. The map of greater Palestine had been drastically redrawn. Almost half of the greater Palestinian area was now part of the kingdom of Assyria. The other half was part of the Assyrian political system in that it consisted of several vassal states."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 665-666, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 669-670, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 899-900, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 100, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
Hanoch Reviv, "The Canaanite and Israelite Periods (3200-332 B.C.)" The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 101, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
The battle at Carchemish, like the fall of Nineveh, changed the political picture of the Near East. A new imperial ruler had emerged: Babylonia."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 760, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 781, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
The twenty-one-year-old Zedekiah (597-586 B.C.) remained professedly loyal to Nebuchadnezzar for a number of years, after which he yielded to the chronic temptation to the urge of his nationalist leaders and as usual counted on Egyptian aid. Exasperated, Nebuchadnezzar dispatched an army intent upon the destruction of Jerusalem, which was put under siege."
Philip K. Hitti, The History of Syria , p. 201-202, Macmillan & Co. LTD., 1951
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East , p. 27, Scribner, 1995
"With the capture and destruction of Jerusalem, the kingdom of Judah went out of existence. The land was devastated, and several of the leading classes of the population were killed either in the war or after the capture of Jerusalem."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 798, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 804, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria , p. 217-218, Macmillan & Co. LTD., 1951
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 815, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
"The administrative organization of the empire into satrapies (provinces) started under Cyrus…What is of interest here is the fifth satrapy, Babylonia-Abr Nahara. Palestine was part of this satrapy, which included Mesopotamia and the Babylonian holdings west of the Euphrates. Cyprus was also included in this satrapy…The Persian king often appointed as satraps a member of the country's royal family or some high official well acquainted with the administration and laws of the former nation. The king could also appoint a special commissioner or 'sub-governor' for a certain district, something that happened for Judah. Zerubbabel is an example, and so are Ezra and Nehemiah."
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 821, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria , p. 222, Macmillan & Co. LTD., 1951
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 851-852, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Gosta W. Ahlstrom, The History of Ancient Palestine , p. 904, Sheffield Academic Press, 1993
Andrew Duncan, War in the Holy Land , p. 25, Sutton Publishing Limited, 1998
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History p.113, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
"The decisive battle was at Issus (333 B.C.), whereafter the victorious Greeks occupied Damascus, the Persian headquarters west of the Euphrates. Alexander was, it is true, held up for several months by the obstinate resistance of Tyre, but the pause only gave local rulers an opportunity to pay homage to the conqueror. Among them were the Jewish High Priest, Juddua, and Sanballat, leader of the Samaritans. Alexander does not seem himself to have visited the inland cities, legends to the contrary notwithstanding. After the capitulation of Tyre, and after it had overcome the briefer resistance of Gaza, the Macedonian army advanced directly on Egypt. It returned the following spring on its way to Mesopotamia, where the Persians were finally vanquished. Within two, years, power had changed hands completely."
Michael Avi-Yonah, "The Second Temple (332 B.C. - 70 A.D.)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 116-117, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Country Studies Handbook, Israel , Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Helen Chapin Metz, Editor, 1988
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 121, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
Michael Avi-Yonah, "The Second Temple (332 B.C. - 70 A.D.)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 140, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Andrew Duncan, War in the Holy Land , p. 35, Sutton Publishing Limited, 1998
John Wilkinson, "Jerusalem Under Rome and Byzantium 63-637 A.D.," Jerusalem in History , p. 78, Olive Branch Press, 2000
Country Studies Handbook, Israel , Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Helen Chapin Metz, Editor, 1988
"Of all the multitudinous peoples who constituted the Roman world, the Jews were undoubtedly the most difficult for the Romans to govern. Herod repressed the outbreaks against his authority with bloody fury. After Herod the Judeans continued restive under Roman rule.
In A.D. 67 Vespasian, future emperor, moved against them from Syria at the head of 50,000 troops and dealt them telling blows. His son Titus carried on the operations against Jerusalem, which after a few month's siege was starved to surrender (A.D. 70). The Judean capital was razed and thousands of its inhabitants were slaughtered."
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 149-150 D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East , p. 31, Scribner, 1995
Michael Avi-Yonah, "Jews, Romans and Byzantines (70-633)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 175, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
"The Jews gave up their attempts to throw off the Roman yoke, while the Roman government acknowledged Judaism as a religio licita, its communities enjoying the right to certain exemptions (from military service, for example) and being allowed to exist as juridical entities, to own property, to have their own courts (disguised as tribunals of arbitration), to levy taxes and so on. But, despite these concessions, on two points there was no giving way: the Romans still declined to permit Jews to live in Jerusalem, although restrictions on visits were relaxed, and proselytizing was frowned upon. Within this loosely outlined nexus of official relations, normative Judaism could go on developing."
Michael Avi-Yonah, "Jews, Romans and Byzantines (70-633)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 176, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Michael Avi-Yonah, "Jews, Romans and Byzantines (70-633)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 178 - 179, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Country Studies Handbook, Israel , Library of Congress Federal Research Division, Helen Chapin Metz, Editor, 1988
"Constantine's policy was the same as Hadrian's towards the Jews. They were not allowed to live in Jerusalem, but they made pilgrimage to the western wall of the Temple, and once a year on 'The ninth of Ab' they were allowed into the Temple site to lament its destruction."
John Wilkinson, Jerusalem under Rome and Byzantium , Jerusalem in History , p. 94-95, Olive Branch Press, 2000
Michael Avi-Yonah, "Jews, Romans and Byzantines (70-633)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 180, 182, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
The principal aim of Byzantium was to make Jerusalem Christian. Pilgrimages were encouraged by the provision of hospices and infirmaries, churches rose on every spot connected in one way or another with Christian traditions. The building activity that ensued was one of the causes of the country's urprising prosperity at that time, which is evident from archaeological surveys. There were three to five times as many inhabited places in the fifth-sixth centuries A.D. as in any of the preceding periods."
Michael Avi-Yonah, "Jews, Romans and Byzantines (70-633)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 179-180, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Moshe Gil, A History of Palestine 634-1099 , p. 5, Cambridge University Press, 1992
Moshe Gil, A History of Palestine 634-1099 , p. 5, Cambridge University Press, 1992
Assault soon came from a different quarter. The Arab tribes, converted by Muhammad to his new creed of Islam, attacked Aila (Elath) in the lifetime of the Prophet. The early Caliphs renewed the onslaught, and the battles of Thedun, Ajnadain (both 634) and Yarmuk (636) were decisive. Jerusalem fell in 638 A.D., and within two years Byzantine overlordship in the Holy Land was at an end."
Michael Avi-Yonah, "Jews, Romans and Byzantines (70-633)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 193, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Philip K. Hitti, The Near East in History , p. 209, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 22-23, Warner Books Edition, 1991
"After completing the occupation of Syria and Palestine the Arabs turned to organizing the administration of the newly occupied territories. As they were exclusively fighters and did not have any administrators capable of fitting themselves into the well-developed bureaucracy that the Byzantines had left behind them, they decided to leave the existing system of administration to carry on its work as in the past, with the same local functionaries.
Most of Palestine, up to the border of the valley of jezreel and Beth-shean, belonged to one district known as 'Jund Filatine' which was, in fact, the Palaestina Prima of the BGyzantine era together with part of Palaestina Tertia. Galilee, the southern part o the Lebanon and parts of the Golan fell within Jund Urdunn, which constituted the Palaestina Secunda of the Byzantines."
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 207, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 24-25, Warner Books Edition, 1991
The change was more than one of rulers. The capital of the empire moved to Damascus, a city lying in a countryside abler to provide the surplus needed to maintain a court, government and army, and in a region from which the eastern Mediterranean coastlands and the land to the east of them could be controlled more easily than from Madina."
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 25-26, Warner Books Edition, 1991
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 28, Warner Books Edition, 1991
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 222, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 223, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 31-32, Warner Books Edition, 1991
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 32, Warner Books Edition, 1991
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 224, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria , p. 557, Macmillan & Co. LTD. 1951
With the rule of ibn-Tulun a period of renewed political, social and cultural activity began in Palestine, after the long period of neglect that marked the hundred years of direct Abbasid rule. "
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 226, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 226-227, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Moshe Gil, A History of Palestine 634-1099 , p. 315, Cambridge University Press, 1992
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 227, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
"The Ikhshidid dynasty (935-969), like its predecessor the Tulunid (868-905), had an ephemeral existence. They followed the same pattern of behavior, the pattern that typifies the case of many other states which, in this period of disintegration, broke off from the imperial government. Both made lavish use of state moneys to curry favor with their subjects and thereby ruined the treasuries."
Philip K. Hitti, History of Syria , p. 564, Macmillan & Co. LTD. 1951
Moshe Sharon, "The History of Palestine from the Arab Conquest until the Crusades (633-1099)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 231, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Moshe Gil, A History of Palestine 634-1099 , p. 336, Cambridge University Press, 1992
Moshe Gil, A History of Palestine 634-1099 , p. 397, 420, Cambridge University Press, 1992
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East p. 89 Scribner paperback, 1995
"We have very little knowledge of what happened in Palestine during the period of Turcoman [Seljuk] rule. By and large, however, the Turcoman period, which lasted less than thirty years, was one of slaughter and vandalism, of economic hardship and the uprooting of populations."
Moshe Gil, A History of Palestine 634-1099 , p. 414, 420, Cambridge University Press, 1992
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East p. 90 Scribner paperback, 1995
Emmanuel Sivan, "Palestine During the Crusades (1099-1291)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land p. 240, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
In the interior, looking eastwards to the desert and Iraq, the reaction was preparing. The Seljuk princes who held Aleppo and Damascus were unable to accomplish very much. In 1127, Zangi, a Turkish officer in the Seljuk service, seized Mosul, and in the following years gradually built up a powerful Muslim state in northern Mesopotamia and Syria. His son, Nur al-Din, took Damascus in 1154, creating a sigle Muslim power in Syria and confronting the Crusaders for the first time with a really formidable adversary. The issue before the two sides was now the control of Egypt, where the Fatimid caliphate was tottering towards final collapse."
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East p. 90-91 Scribner paperback, 1995
Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples , p. 84 Warner Books Edition, 1991
"A Kurdish officer called Salah al-Din -- better known in the West as Saladin -- launched a jihad against the Crusaders in 1187. By his death in 1193, he had recaptured Jerusalem and expelled the Crusaders from all but a narrow coastal strip. It was only the break-up of Saladin's Syro-Egyptian empire into a host of small states under his successors which permitted the Crusading states to drag out an attenuated existence for another century, until the reconstitution of a Syro-Egyptian state under the Mamluks in the thirteenth century brought about their final extinction."
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East p. 91 Scribner paperback, 1995
Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History p. 169-170 Oxford University Press, 1993
"Palestine was divided mainly between two of the six provinces of Syria, the province of Damascus and that of Safed. Mameluk officers, appointed as governors, were independent of each other and directly responsible to the sultan, in Cairo. No details exist of the size and composition of Palestine's population under the mameluks."
Moshe Sharon, "Palestine under the Mameluks and the Ottoman Empire (1291-1918)," The History of Israel and the Holy Land p. 278, The Continuum Publishing Group Inc., 2001
Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History p. 172 Oxford University Press, 1993
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East p. 114 Scribner paperback, 1995
Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History p. 167 Oxford University Press, 1993
"Soon after the conquest, the Ottomans joined Palestine to the province of Syria, whose capital was Damascus. Palestine itself was divided into five districts, or Sanjaks, each named after its capital the Sanjak of Gaza, which was the southernmost one, and to the north of it the Sanjaks of Jerusalem, Nablus, Lajjun, and Safed. A Turkish officer was placed at the head of each Sanjak, with the title of Sanjak Bey or Sanjak Beg. The Sanjak Beg of Gaza was the highest-ranking governor in Palestine. All the five Sanjak Begs of Palestine were subordinate to the Beilerbeg, the 'Beg of Begs', of Damascus."
Moshe Sharon, "Palestine under the mameluks and the Ottoman Empire (1291-1918)," A History of Israel and the Holy Land , p. 283,286, Contunuum Publishing Group, 2001
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East , p. 122, Scribner paperback edition, 2003
"In the last third of the 16th century serious cracks began to appear in the structure of the Ottoman empire. The empire embarked on a retrogressive movement which was to continue for more than two centuries. The decline gained momentum towards the end of the 17th century, and deepened in the 18th and 19th centuries. The feudal system, with the sipahis -- the feudal landlords -- as its prop was gradually detiorating. As the wars of expansion came to an end and spoils diminished, the landlords turned with increasing interest to the land, and tried to recoup the loss of spoils by merciless exploitation of the peasants. This naturally led to a sharp drop in agricultural production and ushered in the whole crisis of the empire."
K.J. Asali, "Jerusalem under the Ottomans" Jerusalem in History , p. 207-208, Olive Branch Press, 2000
Bernard Lewis, The Middle East , p. 308, Scribner paperback edition, 2003
"Muhammad Ali and [his son] Ibrahim Pasha tried to win the support of the European powers for their control of Syria by a calculated policy of granting equality of status to members of religious minorities and by opening the country to European missionary and consular activities. This policy unleashed forces which were quickly to be felt in Jerusalem, as the Ottomans, upon their return to the city, could not reverse the Egyptian measures. Whereas before the Egyptian occupation, European consuls and Christian missions could not establish themselves in Jerusalem, and European pilgrims and visitors were not allowed to settle there permanently, the Ottomans had to continue the Egyptian open-door policy."
Alexander Scholch, "Jerusaelm in the 19th Century," Jerusalem in History , p. 229, Olive Branch Press, 2000
"The Jewish population of Jerusalem increased from around 5,000 in 1839 to about 10,000 by the late 1850s."
Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict p. 21, fourth edition, Prentice Hall, 2002
Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict p. 19, fourth edition, Prentice Hall, 2002
Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict p. 26, fourth edition, Prentice Hall, 2002
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